

Message Text

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CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 HONG KONG 00963

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: THE UA REGIME'S RECORD: LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND POLICY
COMMITMENT

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INTRODUCTION: WITHIN OUR FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS OF THE HUA
REGIME AND ITS OPERATIONS (REFTEL C), WE RECENTLY HAVE EXAMINED
THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMIZATION OF THE NEW CHINESE REGIME
(REFTEL B) AND THE CONSTRAINTS WHICH HAMPER THE HUA LEADER-
SHIP IN SETTING POLICY (REFTEL A). THIS MESSAGE DISCUSSES
THE POLICIES AND COMMITMENTS WITH WHICH THE REGIME HAS CAUSED
ITSELF TO BE ASSOCIATED AND ITS PROGRESS TO DATE IN MOVING
BEYOND THE PURGE OF THE "GANG OF FOUR."

THE HUA REGIME HAS BUILT ITSELF ON THE PILLARS OF A
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DIRECT BLESSING FROM CHAIRMAN MAO AND ITS DECISIVE ACTION
TO "PREVENT" THE "GANG" FROM OVERTURNING THE CHINESE REVOLU-
TION. WHILE OBTAINING A RELATIVELY WIDE RANGE OF POPULAR
SUPPORT FROM THIS, THE REGIME FACES UNCERTAINTY AMONG MIDDLE-
LEVEL AND LOWER-RANKING CADRES, MANY OF WHOM CAME UP UNDER
THE LABEL OF THE "YOUNG" IN MAO'S THREE-IN-ONE LEADERSHIP
COMBINATION OF OLD, MIDDLE-AGED, AND YOUNG AND WHO LOOKED

TOWARD THE PURGED PROPONENTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION IDEALS AS THEIR MENTORS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A RESIDUAL GROUP OF "SUPPORTERS" AND "FOLLOWERS" WHO REMAIN TO BE REMOVED OR IDEOLOGICALLY REMODELED WITHIN BOTH THE PARTY AND THE BUREAUCRACY.

THE REGIME'S CONCERNS ABOUT THESE PEOPLE AND THE RECURRENT PROBLEMS OF FACTINALISM IN CHINA HAVE CONFOUNDED EFFORTS TO MOVE SWIFTLY BEYOND THE PURGE OF THE "GANG OF FOUR" AND HAMPERED ITS ABILITIES TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND ALLEGIANCES OF THE SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO ARE THEMSELVES IN QUESTION AND THE CASE FOR REHABILITATING TENG HSIAO-PING HAS BEEN A NAGGING PROBLEM WHICH BECAME MORE VOCAL WITH THE ANNIVERSARY OF PREMIER CHOU'S DEATH.

THE REGIME HAS ADOPTED IN GENERAL THE IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF "MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE" AND SUPPORT FOR THE "ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION." IT HAS ALSO RESURRECTED A TWENTY-YEAR -OLD MAO DOCUMENT" ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS" WHICH, WHILE WARNING OF PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION, CASTS THE REGIME IN A PRAGMATIC PROBLEM-SOLVING IMAGE, LOOKING TOWARD PROVIDING A BETTER LIFE FOR THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND A RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. SPECIFIC POLICY CHANGES HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO APPEAR, BUT THE IMAGE OF FORWARD MOVEMENT HAS BEEN JERKY AS THE REGIME AS BEEN FORMED TO RESPOND TO PROVINCIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FACTIONALISM AND PURGING OF THE "GANG'S" SUPPORTERS. HOW THE REGIME IN THIS ENVIRONMENT IS ABLE TO BUILD A CONSENSUS AMONG ITS MEMBERSHIP

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AND FORGE AND ACT ON POLICY DECISIONS WILL ULTIMATELY DETERMINE HOW WELL THE HUA LEADERSHIP GROUP IS ABLE TO MEET ITS CONSTITUENTS' EXPECTATIONS. END INTRODUCTION.

1. IN THE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE PURGE OF THE "GANG OF FOUR"--WANG HUNG-WEN, CHANG CHUN-CHIAO, CHIANG CHING AND YAO WEN-YUAN--BUILDING UP THE IMAGE OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP HAS MEANT FIRST BUILDING UP THE IMAGE OF THE PARTY CHAIRMAN/PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG AND THAT OF THE PARTY CENTER AS THE DECISIVE BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVING AGAINST THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES." THE FOCUS OF THE MEDIA WHICH BUILT UP HUA, HOWEVER, ALSO ZEROED IN ON THOSE AROUND HIM, WITH THE CHOUIST BUREAUCRACY REPRESENTED BY LI HSIEN-NIEN AND THE PLA REPRESENTED BY YEH CHIEN-YING MOVING INTO POSITIONS OF PROMINENCE ONLY SLIGHTLY BEHIND HUA. THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR YEH CHIEN-YING WHO AS THE ONLY SURVIVING MEMBER OF THE DECIMATED POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE-PARTY VICE CHAIRMEN RANKS HAS APPEARED IN SIGULAR FASHION WITH HIS OWN SPECIAL BILLING AND WITH MORE THAN PERFUNCTORY PUBLICITY AND AUTHORITY.

2. THE REGIME INITIALLY WAS THE RECIPIENT OF WIDELY-BASED POPULAR SUPPORT BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL ANTIPATHY TOWARD CHIANG CHING AND HER COHORTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE REGIME HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MOVE RAPIDLY BEYOND THE PURGE OF THE "GANG" AND STEP SMARTLY INTO THE NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WORLD WHICH THE PEOPLE EXPECTED AND WHICH THE REGIME IMPLICITLY PROMISED. FIRST THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF THE DEGREE OF POPULAR SUPPORT. WHILE THERE WAS A GENERAL DISTRUST OF CHIANG CHING'S AMBITIONS BASED ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION EXPERIENCE, A BROAD SECTOR OF MIDDLE-LEVEL AND LOWER-RANKED CADRES THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION LOOKED TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES AS THE GUARANTORS OF THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS AND FUTURE ADVANCEMENT.

3. IN ADDITION TO THOSE WHO AT LEAST SYMPATHIZED WITH THE IDEALS WITH WHICH THE "GANG" ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES, THERE WAS
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ALSO A GROUP WHICH HAD MORE OR LESS "JOINED" AS FULL-FLEDGED SUPPORTERS AND FOLLOWERS. CONTRARY TO OUR EARLIER EXPECTATIONS AND PERHAPS EVEN TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE CHINESE, THIS GROUP SEEMS TO BE RATHER NUMEROUS THOUGH ITS ACTUAL NUMBERS ARE CONFUSED BY MANIPULATION OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN TO SETTLE LOCAL GRIEVANCES.

4. REMOVING THE INDIVIDUALS FROM POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE AT THE CENTER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RATHER STRAIGHT-FORWARD, BUT IN THE PROVINCES THE QUESTION RAN HEAD ON INTO THE PERENNIAL CONTENTIONS FOR POWER AND INFLUENCE WHICH HAVE PLAUGUED PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS REGULARLY FOR AT LEAST A DECADE. IRRESPECTIVE OF CENTER PLANS TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF PURGES AND TO ALLOW THE "CONFESSED" TO RESTART A NEW LIFE OF SERVICE TO THE NATION, THE DESIRE TO "SETTLE SCORES" APPEARS TO HAVE FRUSTRATED, AND IN SOME CASES PARALYZED, LOCAL ADHERENCE TO CENTER POLICIES. AND, IN AT LEAST THREE CASES (HONAN, HOPEH, AND FUKIEN) THIS PROBLEM HAS RESULTED IN THE PLA BEING CALLED IN TO SETTLE BOTH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF UNREST AND TENSION AND GENERAL CADRE INACTIVITY AND PARALYSIS (HK 329).

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5. ALTHOUGH THE CENTER'S LEADERSHIP PICTURE REMAINED BASICALLY UNCHANGED IN THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE PURGE OF THE "GANG OF FOUR," THERE CONTINUE TO BE NAGGING DOUBTS ABOUT SOME OF THE LEADERS AND THEIR INTER-RELATIONS IN THE NEW REGIME. WHILE WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF A GENERAL REVIEW OF THESE PERSONALITIES AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE HUA REGIME, SUFFICE IT TO SAY FOR THE PRESENT THAT THESE DOUBTS INVOLVE THE LEADERSHIP ROLES OF WU TEH, WANG TUNG-HSING, LI TEH-SHENG, AND CHEN HSI-LIEN WHO REPRESENT ONE-THIRD OF THE ACTIVE POLITBURO FIGURES WHO SURVIVED THE OCTOBER PURGE. THE CENTER'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARD NEW APPOINTMENTS TO FILL FACANCIES IN EVEN THE LESS-SENSITIVE STATE COUNCIL MINISTERIAL LINEUP AT THE RECENT NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC) SESSION APPEARS INDICATIVE OF A DIVISION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP OVER POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

6. KEY TO THIS DIVISION OF POWER IS THE CASE OF THE FORMER
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VICE CHAIRMAN/VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING WHO FELL FROM GRACE AFTER PREMIER CHOU'S DEATH IN JANUARY 1976 AND WHO WAA DISMISSED FROM OFFICES IN APRIL AFTER THE TIEN AN MEN INCIDENT. TENG'S REHABILITATION AND THE CALL TO REINTERPRET THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" INCIDENT HAS BEEN A PRIME FOCUS OF THE RECENT COMMEMORATIONS OF CHOU EN-LAI'S DEATH AND THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SIGNS OF AN ANTI-HUA CAMPAIGN CRITICIZING HIS "USURPATION OF POWER" IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. AS A DIRECT BENEFICIARY OF TENG'S FALL (REFTEL A), HUA'S POWERBASE IS PUT INTO QUESTION AND HIS

INFLUENCE WILL LIKELY FLUCTUATE RELATIVE TO THE POSITION IN WHICH TENG RETURNS. WITH A PUBLIC OUTCRY ALSO IN TENG'S FAVOR, PROSPECTS FOR TENG'S ULTIMATE LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED AND HUA IS LIKELY AWARE THAT A TENG WHO RETURNS VINDICATED A SECOND TIME WILL BE A DIFFICULT MAN TO RESTRAIN, EVEN IF THERE IS BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEM.

7. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN AN APPARENT CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY OVER THE POWER RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE TOP LEADERS AND ALSO BETWEEN THE CENTER AND THE PROVINCES, THE REGIME'S COMMITMENT TO POLICIES APPEARS MORE READILY DEFINABLE. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IS THE REGIME'S ATTENTION TO THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD AND WELFARE. AT THE OCTOBER 24 PEKING RALLY, THE REGIME TOOK UP A MAO QUOTATION--"A POLITICAL SITUATION IN WHICH THERE ARE BOTH CENTRALISM AND DEMOCRACY, BOTH DISCIPLINE AND FREEDOM, BOTH UNITY OF WILL AND PERSONAL FREEDOM OF MIND AND LIVELINESS"-- AND ADOPTED IT AS A THEME.

8. PROMOTING PRODUCTION BECAME A MAJOR TENET OF THE REGIME AND THE RELEASE OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S 1956 THESIS "ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS" LINKED THE REGIME'S DESIRES TO CREATE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH A MAO PHILOSOPHICAL BASE THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO JUSTIFY MOST ANY POLICY. SPECIFICALLY, THE REGIME INITIATED A NEW TACK ON FOREIGN TRADE WITH A REALISTIC APPROACH TOWARD SELECTIVE BUT WIDE-RANGE TRADE CONTACTS AND TRADE EXPANSION. IN ADDITION, THE CONCLUSION OF THE REGIME'S SECOND NATIONAL LEARNING FROM CONFIDENTIAL

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TACHAI CONFERENCE PROMISED RENEWED ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURAL MECHANIZATION AND THE HOPE OF A NEW INDUSTRIAL WAGE PACKAGE APPEARS TO BE WIDESPREAD.

9. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS ATTENTION ACROSS-THE-BOARD TO CENTER CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE, THE REGIME PROMISED NO RELAXATION OF CONTROLS IN THE CULTURAL FIELD. A NUMBER OF WORKS FROM THE PRE-CULTURAL REVOLUTION PERIOD WERE REVIVED AND RESTAGED ACROSS THE NATION, AND STEREOTYPES IN THE LITERARY AND ART FIELD SEEM TO BE WEAKENING. THE PRE-CULTURAL REVOLUTION USE OF THE COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM AS A MEASURE OF AN INCOMING STUDENT'S POTENTIAL HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS "GOOD", THUS TURNING THE EDUCATION FIELD MORE TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATED, RATHER THAN JUST POLITICALLY CONSCIOUS, YOUTH. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE MILITIA'S ROLE HAS BEEN REDEFINED TO FOCUS ON A NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE AND A "SHOCK FORCE" FOR PRODUCTION MISSION WITH PLA DOMINANCE AND CONTROL MORE FIRM. MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WHICH PERSISTED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF "GANG OF FOUR" INFLUENCE AT THE CENTER, HAS ALSO BEEN GIVEN FURTHER ATTENTION.

10. MUCH OF THE REGIME'S POLICY COMMITMENT HAS BEEN VOCAL

AND COSMETIC RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIAL AND THE SHIFTS WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN THE POLICY FIELD HAVE BEEN ONES WITH RELATIVELY LOW CONFRONTATION LEVELS AND WHICH IN PART REVERSED POSITIONS WHICH WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE "GANG OF FOUR." WHEN THE REGIME HAS HAD MAJOR CONFERENCES--SUCH AS THE NPC SESSION AND THE TACHAI CONFERENCE--THE RESULTS WERE POLITICALLY MORE RELATED TO PAST EVENTS THAN TO ANY PROJECTED NEW LEADERSHIP INITIATIVES. THUS, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT, THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP FOLLOW-THROUGH ON ITS PROMISES WILL BE THE CRITERION WHICH WILL MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF ITS IMAGE BUILDING.

11. A REGIME WITHOUT A MAO WHO OUTWARDLY COULD COMMAND ABSOLUTE, UNQUESTIONED ALLEGIANCE AT CRUCIAL TIMES, AND WITHOUT A CHOU WHO COULD TRANSLATE THE IDEOLOGICAL GOALS OF THE CHAIRMAN INTO PRACTICAL POLICY WITHOUT DOING HARM TO EITHER IDEOLOGY OR
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POLICY, MEANS A REGIME WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE STARKLY INDIVIDUAL AND SELF-SERVING. WITH TENG HSIAO-PING IN THE WINGS, THE POTENTIAL FOR LEADERSHIP STABILITY IS FURTHER DIMINISHED, AND CONSENSUS ON GENERAL GOALS COULD BREAK DOWN ONCE ACTUAL POLICY DECISIONS HAVE TO BE MADE ON SPECIFIC PRIORITIES. FAILURE TO MEET THE HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS WHICH THE REGIME HAS HELPED TO GENERATE CAN ONLY END IN A GRADUAL WEAKENING OF CENTER ABILITY TO CONTROL THE NATION. THIS ULTIMATELY WILL RESULT IN EITHER A GROWING ASSERTIVENESS BY REGIONAL POWERHOLDERS TO CONTROL THEIR OWN BAILIWICKS OR AN ASSUMPTION OF THE REINS OF CENTRAL POWER BY THE ORGANIZED FORCES OF THE PLA.
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